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  This paper considers an extension of the classical static labor-leisure choice 
model to allow for an on-the-job leisure choice.  The key result is that an income-
compensated wage increase, while theoretically increasing hours worked, will likely 
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Introduction 
The classical static labor-leisure choice model assumes that time spent at work is 
leisure-less (see, e.g., Ehrenberg and Smith, 2000).  That is, work effort on the job is 
implicitly assumed to be at its maximum, which is rarely recognized in the literature.  A 
simple extension of the classical model is considered, which allows for workers to choose 
time not spent at work (off-the-job leisure) as well as leisure time on-the-job.  This 
extension has not yet been shown for the hourly wage model—it has been shown for 
piece-rate pay (Dickinson, 1999) and efficiency wages (Lin, 2003).  Dickinson (1999) 
comments that the extension of his Combined Model to hourly (as opposed to piece-rate) 
wages leads to ambiguous results on work effort, but he does not elaborate or derive the 
result.  This paper fills the gap by deriving the key result of this extension of the classic 
hourly wage model. 
 
The Classical Labor-Leisure Model Extension 
  Assume a utility function that is quasiconcave, twice continuously differentiable, 
and increasing in consumption, c, off-the-job leisure, l, and on-the-job leisure, hl.  
Therefore, we have U=U(c,l,hl) with UUU clh l >> > 00 0 ,,      and the usual diminishing 
marginal utility assumption.  To simplify the notation in much of the derivations, I will 
often refer to goods c, l, and hl as goods 1, 2, and 3, respectively.  For example, 
UUU clh l ,,      will be referred to as U1, U2, and U3 (with similar numeric notation for 
higher order derivatives).  In the classical labor supply model, workers are paid a wage, 
w, per hour of work, h, and the constraints are:  
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  wh+F=pc (the budget constraint) 
  h+l=T       (the time constraint) 
 
where F is exogenous income, c is consumption, p is the price of consumption, and T is 
total time available for work or off-the-job leisure.  The important new constraint 
introduced in the Combined Model of hourly wages is 
 
  hw+hl=h     (the work time constraint) 
  
where hw is productive hours spent at work.  The budget constraint can be written as 
usual, wT-wl+F-c=0 (where p is normalized to p=1), and the Lagrangian to be 
maximized is now 
L=U(c,l,hl) + λ(wT-wl+F-c)       ( 1 )  
The first order conditions from the constrained maximization problem are: 
                       Lλ:  wT-wl+F-c = 0                 
  L1:  U1-λ   =   0         ( 2 )  
                       L2:  U2-λw   =   0          
                       L3:  U3 =   0         
     
It is important to note that a solution will only exist at a point where the marginal utility 
of on-the-job leisure, hl, is equal to zero, which follows from the assumption that workers 
are paid for all hours at work, whether or not they are productive hours. 
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Because the Jacobian matrix is identical to the bordered-Hessian matrix of the 
constrained maximization problem is (1), we know that  J <0 from the second-order 
conditions for utility maximization.  Thus, the conditions of the Implicit Function 
Theorem will hold, and there exists a neighborhood in which we can define the set of 
implicit functions 
        ) , ( F w λ λ =  
) , ( F w c c =        ( 4 )  
                                             ) , ( F w l l =  
                                              ) , ( F w h h l l =  
 
The comparative static analysis will focus on the wage and income effects on off- and on-
the-job leisure. 
Comparative Static Analysis 
  First, totally differentiate the first-order conditions in (2) and arrange to get 
                              dF Tdw ldw wdl dc − − = − −                 
   −+ + + = d U dc U dl U dhl λ 11 12 13 0                    (5) 
  −+ + + = wd U dc U dl U dh dw l λ λ 21 22 23  
                 0 33 32 31 = + + l dh U dl U dc U  
                   
The income effects are found by setting dw=0 and dividing each equation by dF.  
Interpreting each ratio as a partial derivative, we have 
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The total wage effects are found by setting dF=0 and dividing the equations in (5) 
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In each of (10) and (11), the result is the typical breakdown of the total wage effect into 
substitution (first term) and income effect (second term).  The classical result from the 
static labor-leisure choice model is that the compensated wage effect on leisure (labor) is 
negative (positive).  As can be seen, this result holds in the expanded model: 
0     ) (
 









       ( 1 2 )  
Absent an income effect that is strong, the hours-of-labor supply curve will slope upward, 
as in the classical labor-leisure choice model.  However, the key result is that the 
compensated (i.e., substitution) effect on on-the-job leisure has an ambiguous sign. 
  ) (
 











       ( 1 3 )  
So, this compensated wage effect on on-the-job leisure in (13) is only negative if 
wU31<U32.  Considering the variables involved, the most plausible assumption is that 
U32>0.  That is, there is a type of substitutability between on- and off-the-job leisure such 
that an increase in the consumption of one decreases the marginal utility of the other.  
This was also the critical assumption to produce a positive compensated wage effect on 
off-the-job leisure in the piece-rate model in Dickinson (1999) and the efficiency wage 
model of Lin (2003).   
The assumption that U32>0 is most reasonable given that on- and off-the-job 
leisure, by definition, cannot be consumed together.  On the other hand, U31 is likely to be 
zero or positive.  A utility function that is additively separable in consumption and on-
the-job leisure would produce U31=0, whereas U32>0 would result if consumption and on- 
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the-job leisure are complementary in the sense that an increase in consumption increases 
the marginal utility of on-the-job leisure (e.g., using work time to shop online).  In short, 









Therefore, the modification of the classical labor-leisure choice model, which considers 
work effort a choice variable along with hours of work, implies that a compensated wage 




A criticism of the model extension presented would lie in the fact that workers are 
paid for all time on-the-job, regardless of whether they are working or not.  While this is 
a valid criticism, it serves to highlight a key criticism of the classical labor-leisure choice 
model.  Namely, time spent at work is not necessarily time spent working.  Once this is 
made explicit, employers may then choose to monitor workers’ on-the-job activities—an 
efficiency wage type model such as in Lin (2003) is more complete.  Hammermesh 
(1990) examines break times at work and also concludes that, while some level of on-the-
job leisure may be appropriate, managers would do well to monitor workers.  His 
theoretical model, however, does not examine a dual choice of both hours of work and 
work effort. 
The goal of this present paper is to show the confounding effects on actual “labor 
supply” that begin to appear as soon as one introduces the second leisure dimension to  
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the theoretical model.  All of the existing models in the literature that allow for on- and 
off-the-job leisure, whether it be an hourly, piece-rate, or efficiency wage model have key 
similarities.  Namely, the standard wage effects must operate through an interaction of 
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